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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\L\LK ER BASK AXD TReST CO:Ml'c\\ Y. Adrnini~trator of the Estates of
.\11\.'\ETTA WALKER, aka NETTIE
\L\LK EH. dt>eemwd, and ILA .MIN\ ET'L\ WALKER, deceased, and
J()llX A. \YALKl·~H, deceased, and
H. £. WALKER, ROMA
ALKER
(;HOCK and AL TA FAY ·wALKER

'V

LAKE,

Plaintiffs-Respondents,
and
.J. B. WALKER,
I ni:oluntary Plaintiff,
vs
J\r~TIN 'VALKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case
No.10374

Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents
~ATl-RE

OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW

J)pf endant

has sufficiently indicated the nature of the
l'a~u and the trial court's disposition of it. Defendant has
al~o indicated the necessity for making reference to the
rPc·ord of Walkf'r Bank & Trust Co., et al. v. J.B. Walker
whieh was triPd as a companion of the instant case. That
n·c·ord has been certified as supplemental record herein.
1

W~en reference to the J. B. \Y alk<>r ca::;e is made in thj,

brief, such reference will de::;i(J"nate the "J B \\' R
b

•

•

•

·

l'COrd:

STATEl\lENT OF FACTS
Defendant-appellant is one of six children of John
A. and l\Iinnetta \Valker. Plaintiffs-re::;pondents ar~ llli
mother's personal representative, his deceased sister'~
personal representative and all his living brothers and
::;isters.
John and Minnetta settled on approximately fom
acres in Union, Utah, at about the turn of the cen~.
Title to a part of that acreage was vested in jlinnetta
alone from the time of acquisition. This is the acre~
shown in pink on Exhibit 3.
John A. \V alker died in 1912. Except for about ont
year in 1952-3, Minnetta lived in the family home un~J
her death in N overnber of 1959, at the age of eighty-nine.
During that year, she lived with and was cared for by her
daughter Fay (R. 119). Until 1933, most of her childm
were living with her. After 1938, one or both of hir
daughters, Roma and Ila, lived with her and cared for
her ( R. 119, 120, 143, 166, 244, 251, et seq.) Especiail;
after 1940, that care involved extensive effort. Minnetta
was frequently bedfast (R. 243-6); her legs requireddsil1
wrapping (R. 120); her stomach required daily pumpiD!
( R. 166, 251). She needed, and received from her dallPters all the services of a cook, housekeeper and nurse
(R. '120, 121, 243-6, 251-4). Ila and Roma were the ehie!
means of Minnetta's financial support throughout !kt
period (R. 120, 159, 203, 217, 440, 470).
2

I

,John A. and l\linnetta ·walker had carried on two
f~ind~ of gainful activity on the tracts they settled. They
opt>rntPd a storP, and they farmed. After John's death,
.\I rnrwtta eontinut.>d the operation of both. All the chil.ir1·n assistPd in the farm work as farmers' children do.
,\ftPr 1~1:~3, wht>n defrndant married, there were no male
diildn·n at home to operate the farm. Defendant moved
to a 1io11u· very dm;e to his mother's and entered into
a ('(1lll rad for the use of the farm. The terms of the
('ontra.et wPre such that defendant occupied the farm and
r"tained tht> proceeds from the sale of its produce in con:'idl·rntion only of his payment of the taxes (JBW Record
11. ljlj, .J B\V Exh. P.-14, Record page 435 et seq.). We
"di lat Pr discuss this contract in detail. Defendant paid
the tax\:'s and no other rental; he controlled the property
alisolutPly (R. ±3ti), decided what to plant (R. 436) and
could have excluded his mother from the farm (although
not from the house) had he desired (R. 437).
During the period defendant was the tenant of the
farm, he provided some hay for his mother's cows; he
also reeeived milk and other dairy products from her
( R 247). The record is saturated with testimony about
tlit> abundance or paucity of the hay provided and the
dairy products received in return, but the court could
n•asonably have believed that the exchange, in value,
ww about even.
In 19±8, .Minnetta Walker suffered serious illness by
n,ason of pyloric obstruction. She was then seventy1·ight yPars old. The "debilitation" caused by that obstruetion eould, in the opm10n of her physician, have
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caused some mental changes at that time ( R. 301). 0th~·
witnesses testified to a marked decline in her inent~
condition after this illness ( R. 122--1, 189, 252). In 19:~
while living in Nevada \vi th her daughter Fay, she W8.\
clearly disoriented (R. 266). In 1954, a few months ht
fore she executed the deeds in controversy, she was again
hospitalized. At this time, the hospital records show sh·
demonstrated all the objective and subjective symptomi
of senile dementia. She had extensive artereosclero~ 1 ~
bilateral arcus senilis was observed; she was deforml'I!
by arthritis; she could remember none of her history 1r
even that she had recently eaten or seen the doctor (Ext.
P-9).
Throughout 1954, ~linnetta exhibited these general
indicia of senility. Her conversation was sparse and con.
sisted of continued repetitions of phrases such as ''aren:
they pretty" about quilting blocks or flowers (R.m1
Her coherent statements were about events of the remot~
past which she was apparently re-living (R. 276, 21i),ana
and she would forget having eaten as soon as the dishei
were cleared ( R. 177). There is no question about her in·
ability to care for herself. Defendant's wife would brin;
her prepared baby food for lunch when Roma was awa:
working, and feed it to her (R. 172). There were manr
instances when Minnetta failed to recognize her children
by sight ( R. 243, 244) or name ( R. 178) or confuse there
with her deceased brothers ( R. 243). \Vhen she wa.'l ab!•
to leave her bed after her return from the hospital m
the summer of 1954, she continually "shuffled" to ani
from the outside toilet (R. 245) making each trip withonl
apparent memory of the last.
4

111 ( >dolwr of 1954, while Roma was away at work,
defrndant put his mother in his car and took her to the
: ank wht>n' a hank officer witnessed her signature on two
1
dt>( d~ 11n·pared by an attorney at defendant's request.
Ir' tlw,,1• an' valid deeds, she then conveyed to defendant
l'':t·rytlting of value she owned---certainly everything
,Ji.i"·ndant believed she owned (R. 438, 9) and disinherited
lier daug-hter Ila, who had lived with her and financially
,,u 1.p(lrtt•d her for fifteen years, her daughter Roma,
,, Jio \\~a:-; nursing her, cleaning her, cooking for her and
111·oyidtng rnorn'y for her maintenance at that very time,
and h1·r daughter Fay, who had cared for her during the
J'l'l'('eding year ( R-119, 248).
Defendant's strategem, on the day the deeds were
;-;igrwd, workl'<l well. He was able to get his mother (de: ; pitP the extreme difficulty her movement entailed-R.
:ns) to the bank at an hour when Roma was away and
after banking hours when no bank customers who might
know the ·walker family could observe (R. 348). He
tlwn "buried" the deeds and made no mention of them
until his mother's death when he promptly and triumphantly recordPd them (Exhibits P-4, P-6).
LatP in 1954, defendant's sister Ila was terminally ill
of eaneer (J<:xh. P-1, 2). She was then addicted to a drug

called "demerol ". Defendant visited her frequently (R.
1i-t) def'pite her evident dislike for him when she was
WPll (Exhibit P-8). By December, Ila was making referPfi('l'I:' to dPfondant as the only person in her family she
eould trust (H. 330), and by Christmas she had delivered
a111l eonveyed to defendant, upon an orally expressed
5

trust, everything of valuP shP had accmnulated in ht
lifetime of ernploy11wnt. The property transforn·d inr
eluded bonds and cash in Pxcess of $-1,000.00 (JB\\' &,.
pp. 19, 20). It includt>d 33 shares of stock in l'tah l' O\\er
..
& Light Company ( J B W Hecord, p. 19) and 15 share~ 111
Amalgamated Sugar Company stoek (JB\\' Reeord ~·
19). In addition, Ila then eoffveyPd to dt>fendant re:JJ
property having a value at that time of approximateh
$3,000.00 ( JB\V Hecord, p. 291). The securities anrl
realty have appreciated substantially in the ensuing
tPn years ( J B\V Record, p. 297).
Of these assets, Defendant expended approximately
$3,S50.00 in payment of the expenses of Ila's !Mt illne~1
and burial ( J B \V Record, p. 20) Ile retained thereafte 1
assets having a value near $5,000.00. He admits the prop.
erties were to be utilized only for the benefit of his mother
( R. p. 8). Nevertheless, as he expended moneys on llli
mother's behalf thereafter, he kept careful account (JB\\'
Record - pp. 23-38) and filed tax returns by which ht
represented these payments Wl•re out of his own resourt'f'1
( R. p. 441) so that he could claim his mother was a dtpendent. He so represented even though he knew, as fit
himself testified, that the trust was the source of \nP
money ( R. 441).
Defendant has steadfastly refused to account fortht
assets he received from Ila, has denit>d obligation to do~"
(R. p. 161) and responds to demands with the bare ~tak
ment that the trust properties were exhausted in the 111
complishment of the trust purposes (R. pp. 8-9). Defenfr
ant contends that, by a process of self-dealing and('(\.
6

111 ingling of trust assPts with his own, he has acquired
tlw :-1•1·uriti<•s and realty which were the corpus of the
trll,.. t.

ARGUMEN1,
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDING OF CONRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDANT
.~:\V m:-::- ..\!OTHER AND THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DEED~ IN CONTROVERSY WERE PROCURED BY UNDUE
!XFLl'ENCE AND ABUSE OF THAT RELATIONSHIP.
FlllE~TIAL

Dd't>1Hla11t-appellant suggests, in the opening para!!ntphs of his bri<>f, that this court may approach the
e\·idence in an "equitable proceeding" as a trial de novo
on tht· n·eord, place its own interpretation on the testi111011,,- and make new findings without regard for those
fadors of witiwss appearance and demeanor which only
tl11· trial judg-e ran appraise. This has not been the posit11•n of this Court. \Yhatever the nature of the proceedings, thP trial ('ourt's findings are accorded the greatest
rt>spPd. In Jeu-ell l'. Horner, 366 P.2d 594; 12 U. 2d 328,
Justiee Callist<•r stated what is the universal doctrine
in this reg-ard:
"This case is one in equity. The dominant
q1wstion here is whether the plaintiffs, by clear
eonvineing and satisfactory proof, established the
alh·gt·d parol trust with respect to the real propPrty. The trial court so found, and this court, upon
rPviPw, should not set aside the finding of the
lmver eourt unless it manifestly appears that the
lowN eourt has misapplied proven facts or that
the finding is dearly against the weight of the
evidenee."
7

(Citing Jensen i·. Hou:P!l, 75 l'ah G4 28')P
1034; Capps v. Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P.2d 4~n
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465· Ha'·
v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229.)
' u,
To begin with, the trial court found there to hat,
been, in 1954, a confidential relationship betwp.en the dtf endant and his mother. This finding must stand un
less, in the words of Jewell v. J-1 orner, it is "clearil
against the weight of the evidence." It should be helpf~
to review, therefore, the concept of confidential relation.
ship and what kind of evidence, under the cases, will p~.
tablish it.
The doctrine is widely accepted that, where a "con.
fidential relationship" in fact exists between a grantor
and grantee, the grantee who is accused of acquiring th~
property by abuse of the confidence reposed in him lw
the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction.
This court subscribed to the doctrine in Jardine v. Arch1-bald, 3 U. 2d 88, 279 P. 2d 454, by this language:

"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the donor
and donee, equity raises a presumption against the
validity of such transactions and the burden is r.ast
upon the donee to prove their validity and ~at
there was no fraud or undue influence by proVlilg
affirmatively and by clear and convincing e:ri~enre
compliance with equitable requisites .. T~s is so
because there is implied in every fiduciary or
confidential relationship a superiority held by on.e
of the parties over the other. See Pomeroys
Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed. Vol. 3, Sec. 956.
page 790."
8

....

and again in ,Johnson L John::;on, 9
-t~(I (l!(J~)), by this language:

r.

2nd 40, 337 P. 2d

"ln as~mying the sufficiency of proof, the
plaintiffs here have significant help in the rule
that whPn a confidential relationship is shown to
exist and a gift or conveyance is made to a party
in a superior position, a presumption arises that
tl11• transaction was unfair. The presumption has
tlw fore·<· of evidence. Therefore the burden was
upon tiH· df•fondant Calvin Johnson to convince the
court h~· a preponderance of the evidence that the
transaetion was fair. If he failed to do so, the finding to the contrary was justified, and will not
hP disturbed on appeal unless the contrary evidPn<'e was so clear and persuasive that all reasonahl" minds would so find."

\Citing Omega Investment Co. v. Woolley, 72
nah -!7-l-, 271 P. 797, quoting 2 Pomeroy, Equity
Juri.~·prudcnce, sec. 956. In re Swan's Estate, 4
lltah 2d '277, 293 P.2d 682.)
\\'hat eonstitutes a "confidential relationship" has
ht->en thP suhjt-ct of frequent litigation, and the phrase
has !wen gin"'n a much broader meaning than "fiduciary
rl:'lationship." lt exists whenever confidence is reposed
by a weaker person in a stronger one. The term is def'inPd in Corpus Juris Secundum (26 CJS 772) as follows:
''Confidential relations between grantor and
grantee are not restricted to those formally recognized as fiduciary in character. The courts carefully refrain from defining particular instances
of such relationships in a manner which might exelnde new cases wherein the relation was in fact
eonfidential, and, broadly speaking, the term 'confidential relationship' extends to all cases wherein
trust is reposed on one side and a dominant influ9

ence is exerC'ised on the other. Stated oth ·
·t l
l
·
erw1se
i ias WPn
said
that tlw
krm 'fiduciary r I t' :
ea
ton
.
l
.
.
.
~s us~ d m t 11s con!1P~'.t_10n is a very hroad one, that
it exists,
and rt>hef is granted' in all ra.,,
·
.
•
. ~l> tr·
~vluch .mf1uenc~' has bel~n acquired and ahrn;ed, 1i:,
m wluch eonfidence has bel•n reposPd and b...
trayed, and that the origin of th<> confidente ani·
the source of the influence are immaterial.''
·
Generally, tlw fact of kinship alone is not Pnough 111
establish tlw confidPntial naturP of a rPlationship. It i~
just persuasiv<~ PvidPnee. It should appPar by somf' adrli
tional Pvidenee that ( 1) the grantor n·ally did repo~~
trust and eonfidt-rn•p in thP grant<>t', and (:2) tlw g-rantee
was able to PXPrcise a dominant influPncP. This court ha~
had at lPast two occasions to expres8 i tHP lf as to the kind 11f
evidence which will suffice. In Hairs i·. Jen sen, llli [. ~1~.
209 P.2d 229, this court said:
''The defendant contends that there is no allegation of a confidential relation between Ambn
and ~Irs. Haws. TruP, it is not spPcifically allegeJ
that there was a confidential relation. However,
in the complaint it is allegPd that Mrs. Haws conveyed the property to Amber intending that thlatter hold the property in trust for the bent'f1t
of the whole family. Implicit in this allegation ii
that :Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in .Amber:
otherwise, Mrs. Haws would have not m~de tlw
convf'vance. Thus this allegation along with the
fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and
daughter, which appears on .the face of t~e co~;
plaint, is a sufficient allegation of a co~f1denh~
relation. Scott on Trust, Y ol. I, Sec. +±.2, state~.
'A constructive trust is imposed even ii
there is no fiduciary relationship ~ue~ as th&~
between attorney and client, pnnc1pal an

10

agPnt, trusteP and lwneficiary; it is sufficient
that tht>n' is a family relationship or other
pt>rsonal rPlationship of such a character
that tlw transforor is justified in believing
that tlw transferee will act in his interest.' "
111 J11l111sn11 1. Johnson (supra), this Court found a
1ont'1d1·11tial n·lationship on the basis of kinship (parentd1:ld) 1ilu:- thP faet that the grantor reposed confidence
11 1 tlw grantl-1· as "t>pitomized by his cooperating with
li1111 rn 111aking final arrangemt>nts about his property in
1h1· t>\'l'l1tuality of dt>ath". The element of domination by
tilt' gra11t1·1· was supplit>d, as the court said, by the evid•·rn·1· that th1• grantor was "becoming senile, and was so
ah·dPd that Ju· would he t>asy prey to a scheming person
in whom ht> had confidence". (Our emphasis.)

ln tlw instant cast>, the evidence of the two necessary
1·h·1111·11ts, ( 1) trust and confidence actually reposed and
(~I th1· <lt>fendant's being the superior in influence, are
strong-Pr by far than in the Johnson case. We have the
dt>fPmlant's own tl>stimony (R-439) that his mother trust"d him and his opinions about the property ''implicitly"
and had confidPnce in him, and that he talked with her
ahout tht• property "at intervals" in 1954 (R-439). We
furtlwr han"' his testimony that she conferred with him
aiiuut pussiblt> sales of the property in 1933 and 1947
1 llPposition, p. 3-1-36). As to defendant's being the dominant 1u·rsonality, we have abundant evidence, not of her
"hp1·01ning'' s1.•nile but of her being senile. Dr. Young,
h1·r physician, said so in so many words-"She was senile"
l It :n ti). Dr. Young was defendant's witness. We have
alr1·ady n·viP\n•d the other evidence in detail. On the
11

question of her being "easy prf'y to a seht>ming }>€rson
whom she had confidence," we believe the folio .· in
.
.
\\mg ex.
cerpt from the testimony of Shirlev 'Valker John
d
son e
·
·
fendant's daughter, is eloquent (R. 395, G):
' .
"Q.

A.

D o you have any statement to make as tr
whether your grandmother was alert du · :
this period of time~
nng

I think she remembered things that were _

s~e couldn't remember the day. She had her

hme confused on the day, but she knew-I
mean she knew me, and she would remember
those things.
Q.

Did she talk about her family T

A.

I didn't talk to her too much. I can't remember
specific things. She talked about the weather.
She was appreciative of my taking food .Am.
one who took her food she was appreciati~e
of, even though it was pureed baby food, and
she was so grateful because she appreciated
things that people did for her."

Defendant has cited and quoted from Utah ease5
which hold that "the relation of parent and child ...
does not, in and of itself, create any such preswnption."
This kind of statement cannot be contorted to suggest,
.however, that the fact of the relationship should be ignored. In Utah, as elsewhere, the fact that the suspeet
transaction is between parent and child is a matter of
some consequence. In the view of the recognized trn~
authorities, some of whom have been quoted by this
Court, family relationship is strong if not fully persuasive evidence of "confidential relationship". Professor
Bogert, in Chapter 24 of his exhaustive work on frosts
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(st'P pag<> :205 of Yolume Ill) comments on
till' irnli('ia of the ''confich•ntial relationship" as follows:

11111/

Tr11sf1cs

'' l f, hy rPason of kinship, business association, disparity in age, or physical or mental condition, or otlwr rPason, the grantee is in an espe"iall~· intimatP position with regard to the grantor,
and th<' lattPr imposes a high degree of trust and
<'onfidPncP in the former, the court may find the
n·lationship is tPchnically 'confidential.' The mere
PxistPncl' of such a connection prohibits the one
trustPd from seeking any selfish benefit for himsl'lf, during the course of the relationship, and
g1ws ground for fastening a constructive trust
upon tlw property in the hands of B, the grantee,
irrespective of his oral promise to use it for the
lwnefit of another."
Professor Bogert then quotes with approval from the
California casP of Brison v. Brison, 17 Pac. 689:
"The hPtrayal of such confidence is constructivel:v fraudulent, and gives rise to a constructive
trm;t. This is independent of any element of actual fraud. • • • The law, from considerations of
public policy, presumes such transactions to have
heen induced by undue influence."
Scott on Trusts in Yolume 1, page 253, Section 44.2,
comments on the kind of relationship which is presumed
to be confidential:
... • • A constructive trust is imposed even
though there is no fiduciary relation such as that
between attorney and client, principal and agent,
trustee and beneficiary; it is sufficient that there
is a f arnily relationship or other personal relationship of such a character that the transferor
is justified in believing that the transferee will
aet in his interest."
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One thing
is axiomatic about und1w influu' .11 (••
:
.
t' ' t
sPldorn exprc•1sed in tlw prPsenc•p of thosp \\'ho a · ·.·
I

. .

I,

re mt1>n 11

Pd to hP m.JUr<>d. Tlwr<> are innm1wrahle judieial state.
ments to tht> t>ffoct that thP PvidPnep may and usut:t:
mm;t he eircmnstantial. Tlw Alabama Court in PlII·11,··,,.
i:. Ford, lG-1 80. 2d 908, rPcently said:
''Evidenct> to show undue influence in th'
proc~rPnu•nt of a det>d must be largely circuru.
stantial and need not be of that din•et, affirmatir,
and positive eharacter required to Pstablish a tan.
gible fact". (and see Bounds v. Bounds, 382 SW2d
947 - Texas, 1963)
Courts are frpquently confrontPd with tlw situati11~
wlwre onP of SPVt>ral ehildrPn has procured thr 1·on.
veyancP to him of all or most of a parent's pro1wrty
as the parent approaclws sPnility or death. The cases
fall readily into pattern, and the circumstaners which
mark the exercise of undue influence havt> been the subject of frpquent comml'nt. The t>ditors of Corpus .Jurn
Secundum devote several pages of tht>ir treatise on
deeds to this point. Beginning at page 766 of Yolwn~
2G (Deeds§ 62) they say:
''Particular circumstances which should bl'
taken into consideration in determining whether
a deed was procured ·by undue influence include
the character of the transaction, the divergencr
of results accomplished from results normally tr
be anticipated, the inequality of di~trib~tion, th:
situation of the grantor, the relationship of th
parties, the activity of the beneficiary an? th~
mthe
P articipation by the transferee or· his agent
preparation of the deed, the tune an d rnanntr
of offering suggestions or advice and the under·
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!\·:ng 111otiw tlu•n•of, and the grantor's condition
c;f 1;1ind and body."
l t will :-'PI"VP to ernphasize the soundness of the
,.,,urt':-: finding in the instant case to consider the evid•·ll''(' nt' Pa<'h of these "circumstanct>s" separatt>ly.
A
th /J/11

l'f/1'11C<'

of Results from Those Normally
To Be Anticipated

Tlw n·:-'ult of tlw conveyances, if they are upheld,
as to <lisinliPrit fivt> of six children. Two of them, Ila
arnl Howa, had lived with the grantor practically all
tlwir liws, ha<l lwPn the principal source of her financial
snpport and had rninistered to her incessantly, not only
in ordinary hou::wkeeping, cooking and laundering all without inside plumbing, running water or central
IH'ating (It :no, 371) - but also in the performance of
tlw disagreeable tasks of nursing, the daily wrapping
of uleerat<'<l ll·gs and the incredibly recurrent pumpi11g of lwr stornach. It is hardly to be anticipated that
a rnotlwr would disinherit such daughters, just as both
of th1·m had become seriously ill, in favor of a son who
was e111i1wntly employable, in no financial need and in
no physieal distn'ss.
\1

B
The Inequality of Distribution
'i'11P eonvPyances in question worked as unequal a
distribution as one can achieve among six children.
Ont> got all, and five got none.
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c
The Situation of The Grantor
At the time of the execution of the deeds ' the gran·lOr
was living in a condition which, except for the herculean
efforts of her daughters, would have constituted ex.
treme privation for o·ur society. Before 19-18, when sht
was alert and coherent, she repeatedly spoke of her reliance on her real property for her old age. (R -178 R
'
476) Nevertheless, the defendant insists she freely conveyed to him every asset she possessed without consideration and left herself completely impoverished.
D

The Relationship of the Parties
The grantor and grantee were, of course, mother
and son. He had, for many years, farmed the premises.
She consulted with him about possible sales (Deposition
pp. 34, 35). In his own words, she trusted him "implicitly" (R-439). In response to the question: "Do you
think your mother trusted your opinion about the property f', defendant said: "There is no question in my
mind about that." One wonders what evidence could
more directly bear on the question of whether defendant enjoyed a relationship of which he could tak~
advantage.
E

The Activity of The Beneficiary
Defendant's activity in the procurement of the deeds
demonstrates patience and planning. As late of 19fi,
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lt!· had offt>rl'd his mother $1,000.00 per acre for the

Jiuid in qut>stion. (Deposition of Austin Walker, page
.+ 1 : I:-1 Sti). Although she became increasingly senile -

niarkedly so during the period of pyloric obstruction
lu' made no ostensible effort to obtain the
111 1q4:-, prop1·rty again until 1954. The time was particularly
auspieious for the "discussions about the property"
,1·tii(·h h1· had with his mother in 1954. Ila was hospitalIZt't l and soon to die. Rmna, recovering from heart
:--urg-1 ry and commuting by bus to Salt Lake employn111nt with the Deseret Sunday School, was not pre~1·nt to protect herself. To the degree that Minnetta
1·11ul<l n~eeive impressions and be influenced, defendant
had, for tht' first time, a free hand in moulding her
thoughts. Tht'n' is little question about the kind of
notion dl'fendant sought to instill. He continues to labor
tit(• arguments that he has "paid the truces and fanned
tlw land". He somehow excludes from his conscious1wss the fact - uncontradicted in the evidence - that
he has paid taxes as cheap rental for the land and
farmed it for profit. He acquired no right or equity
in tlw land by his lease contract. He was, in fact, taking
advantage of his family relationship by occupying the
farm at so low a rental. Mr. Fletcher, a land appraiser
,,·hose qualifications are unimpeachable, testified (JBW
1

RPeord p 297) that a reasonable rental for the farm
during the total period of defendant's occupancy would
haw been $18,270.00. The farm included, of course, the
lands in issue here and those in issue in the suit against

.T. B. Walker. Our review of the record (Exh. D-12,
H--!Oi, -!35, JB\V Exh D-20, D-23, D-44) fails to reveal
17

tax payments by dependant in exc<'ss
reference to all of the land involn.•d
from 1920 to the pn•sent. The taxes
all the property from 1~20 to the 1%:2

(.JB\V Exh D-20, D-23, D--1-±)

of $3,551.:25 with
in uoth law sun,
assessed again~~
totaled $5,G-!~.ti:i

.

Defendant was dealing with an 8-± Yl'ar old wurnan
whose mind was at least failing and whose memory had
failed. 1le carefully removed her from lwr home en.
vironment to execute the deed::;, even though movemeut
was slow and painful for her ( R 31~), rather than
bring a notary to her. In her own hollH', she might remember her other children, or Homa might eome hum•
earlv.
. He returned his mother while Roma was away"
and contrived to complete the transaction in seem~·.
He then follO\ved a pattern of conduct which is always
indicative of sharp practice; he hid the executed deeill
for five years until his mother's death without recordation, and recorded them within two days thereafter.

F
The Participation of Defendant in
Preparing the Deed
Defendant and no one else made the arrangementi
for preparation of the deeds. He called the attorne)
(R--101), the deeds were delivered to him, and he movec
his mother out of her home to sign them. He even ar
ranged for the acknowledgement to be taken by a bani
officer who was a stranger to Minnetta (R-317) afte
banking hours.
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G
The Time And Manner of Offering
,"i'1u1:1c.stio11s and Adi·icc
I>d•·rnlant's timing was, of course, excellent. Desi 1ik llis prott>stations that his mother had dt:>termined
•. 11 tltis 1·<>1ll'Sl' of eonduct years earlier, it was in 195-l
that '11· pn·vaih•d on her to sign deeds. She was conrnks<·i11g from an illnc>ss which required hospitalization
and at·t·1·ntuatl>d her symptoms of mental deterioration.
I la luul lw1·n foreed by circumstances of her own illness
t11 rnovP into 8alt Lake. Roma, just recovered from
ht·art surg.•ry, was working or seeking work in Salt
La.kP. ~l inntc•tta was particularly confused, unable to
rP1111>mlwr pn•nts of a few moments before and delightfully t raetabll'.
Then' is little evidence of the actual advice defendant gave his mother. From his deposition, we
know hP of t'Prt>d her $1,000.00 per acre for the property
in 19-l'i (Deposition - page 41; R. 86). We also know he advi:·wd lwr against selling tracts to strangers in 1933
I D<·position - page 3-1) and 1947 (Deposition - page
::;i l. 111 195-1, by his own testimony, he "told mother
that H. A. said a quitclaim deed could be prepared and
~iw11 to 11w, and she agreed that was all right" (R.
-!U-1). TlH' idPa of the conveyances was clearly implanted
Ii~· dl'f Pndant. He admits having discussions with her
about tlw pro1wrty "at intervals" in 1954. There can
hf• littlt> doubt about the amount of emphasis defendant
.!!'aw to his own contributions or his failure to mention
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Ila's and Roma's. There is only doubt that ~linnetta
could comprehend.
H
The Grantor's Condition of .llind And Body

Minnetta's physical condition is not even a mat.
ter of controversy. She suffered for years from open
sores on her legs; she was hump-backed and deformed
from arthritic disease; she was unable to eliminate
naturally because of pyloric obstruction, and her storu .
ach had to be pumped with awesome rPgularity . The
"consultation record" of Dr. Robert M. Dalrymple (page
8 of Exh - p 9) includes a resume of l\Iinnetta's formid .
able array of physical ailments.
As to Minnetta's mental condition, there is testimony in abundance. Defendant maintains she was fully
alert and able to comprehend the consequences of her
acts in 1954 and not so impaired mentally as to be subject to his influence. Plaintiffs and their ·witnesses, on
the other hand, testified as to the advanced state of her
senility in 1954. Defendant's witnesses, inadvertantly,
often contributed to the evidence of mental deterioration.
There is, for instance, this sequence from direct examination of Dr. Harold E. Young, Jr., defendant's '\fit.
ness (R 301):
"Q. Now, Doctor with regard to the illnesses
which vou have described that she was suf·
f ering ·from, I will ask you whether or not
any of those would have any effect upon her
mentality as far as her competency mentally
is concerned.
20

Tl IE COl'RT: You mean as of a certain
datl>!
~IR BOYER: \Yell, as of when she was in
thP hospital to start with .

.A.

Yt>s. I think the debilitation caused bv the
pyloric obstruction could cause some mental
ehan~es at the time.

Q.

~\ml

A.

would this be something that would be
eontinual, or would it be a temporary thing
and clear up Y
It could be a temporary thing, yes, Sir.

And was this condition cleared up at the
time that she was in the hospital in 1954 T
A. According to my hospital notes, the last note
at tlw hospital when she left the hospital on
5/18/5-l indicates that she was improving,
hut I have a note, "She doesn't remember
very well," that she was eating better, and
her leg was essentially the same. That is the
last note on the hospitalization."
Q.

Dr. Young testified he'd been seeing Minnetta for
yt•ars, but he nwrely thought she recognized him (R-309)
and, on most occasions when he visited her, he thought
slw was competent - the plain inference being that, on
sonw oecru;ions, he thought her incompetent (R-303).
"l'ompetPncy" is, of course, a word of art which is not
used carelessly. Dr. Young thought Minnetta drifted
ht•tween competency and incompetency, but there is no
r1uestion as to his opinion about her senility. At page
31() of the Record, on redirect, he stated that opinion as
simply and starkly as possible: "She was senile". It
would not be unusual for her simply to giggle, for in1-'tn.nce, when asked who Dr. Young was on the occasions
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of his visits tR-313). He could not give her instruct·ions
for he~ ~are. They. had to be given to others (R-3lG).
Her ability to function as a sentient being depended on a
factor so precarious as the degree of her hydration wh
she suffered from chronic failure to move fluids into
.
.
er
mtestmes.

t

Gladys Walker, defendant's wife, gave this testi.
mony on cross examination beginning at page -±5i of
the Record:

"Q.

y.our

testimony is that you saw no change
m your grandmother's mental condition from
1954 until approximately the time of her
death except during periods when she was
ilH

A.

Oh you could tell a difference in her mental
- old age coming on naturally, but I felt she
was competent.

Q.

During the entire

A.

Yes. She was failing all along, but she wll.'!n't
really gone."

period~

In the statement of facts, much of the evidenee of
senile dementia is reviewed at length. There is credible
evidence of Minnetta's disorientation, inability to recog·
nize hf>r children, forgetting having eaten, eternally
shuffling to and from the outside toilet and, when coherent, speaking as if she were living in her young adulthood. These are, according to Dr. Roy McDonald, the
symptoms of senile dementia ( R 102). That Minnetla
could sign her name is not evidence to the contrary
(R-103).
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While <lef endant presented some evidence of a limit··<l ahility on his mother's part to comprehend and re-

spon(l in 19:>+, that evidence could hardly be held to
1 o111p1·l th1• trial judge to find that Minnetta was capable
of rPsisting- c!Pfondant's pressure. If anything, the total
pvidt>nre rornpels findings that Minnetta did not, at the
time sl11· signed the deeds, understand the consequences
of her aet, recognize the natural recipients of her bounty
or romprehend the nature and value of her property.
ln Pvaluating the total evidence, particular weight
slwnld 1w given, we believe, to these facts:
1. The only disinterested witnesses who had
close association and repeated opportunity to obsPrve .Minnetta in late 1954, Signe Holmgren and
Yivian Biltz, testified to her lack of mental capacity, not by giving opinion but by describing her
conduct and her utterances - the repeated "aren't
they pretty" about flowers and quilting blocks
which she simply held in her lap, the statements
that she "hadn't eaten all day" made within minutes after her meals, and her inability to comprehend who Ila was (R, pp 168, 177, 178).
2. "\Vhenever any trained person had occasion to observe Minnetta in 1954 and make official
notation of her condition, he invariably made
c01mnent about the signs of her mental deterioration. Dr. Dalrymple (Exh P-9, page 8) wrote:
''History is difficult to obtain because of patient's mental confusion", and he noted the bilateral arcus senilis, the generalized sclerosis and
the advanced arthritic involvment. The nursing
notes for .May 14 include the statement that Minnetta was able to communicate her complaints of
"pain all over'', but also that she "does not remember eating, dressing leg, Dr. being in, etc."
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Dr. Young testified that his last written notat'
before her discharge was of Minnetta's fail·ion
ing
memory.
I
The Absence of Independent Advice

In Jardine v. Archibald (supra), this court com.
mented on the significance of the donor's having received
independent advice as follows:
"Of cour~e, among t~e elements which might
be of great importance m most cases in deter.
mining alleged undue influence where a confiden.
tial relationship exists, is whether independent
advice had been received by the donor, and in
some instances without such proof the donee
might not be able to sustain his burden of proving
good faith. Pomeroy's Equity Jur. 5th Ed., Sec.
956, pages 796-98 states the rule thus:

1

1

'There are a number of cases which Jar
down the rule generally that, in order to r~. 1
but the presumption of undue influence or
unfairness arising from the fact that the
parties to a transaction stood in a confiden.
tial or fiduciary relation, it is necessary to
show that the one reposing confidence acted
upon independent advice. However, in most '
jurisdictions where the question has a.risen
it appears that the courts have not laid.down ,
any such hard and fast rule. The q~esti.on ~
to whether such independent advice is es·
sential is ordinarily determined with respect 1
to the nature of the confidence reposed, the
nature of the transaction, and the cireum·
stances in each particular case. In other
words, a rule requiring proof of independent
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advice is ordinarily applied where it is a
reasonable requirement and where the circumstances are such that it would be difficult to show the fairness of the transaction
without proof of independent advice. The
rule is peculiarly applicable in gift cases • • •
it would seem that proof of independe~t advice is not indispensable where other satisfactory evidence is available to show that
there was no abuse of confidence and that
the transaction was fair and free from the
undue influence inferred from the relationship.'
To the same effect see the Annotation in 123
A.L.R. commencing on page 1505."
In this case, there is not the slightest evidence of
11innetta's having obtained advice of anyone but defendant about the wisdom or fairness of giving all her propPrty to defendant. Defendant made all the arangements.
Exct-pt for defendant's self-serving testimony, the record
would show that defendant was not only the prime mover
hut the only one.
J

The Adequacy of Consideration
The record is clear that, at the time the deeds in
question were signed, defendant gave his mother no
more than $10.00 consideration. (Deposition of Austin
Walker, p. 41). He makes no allegation that he promised
her any further payment, and he made no further payment except as a part of his intricate manipulations of
the trust assets he received from Ila.
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Defendant persists in the plaint that he is n10r~
deserving than the plaintiffs and has built up tremen.
dous equities because of his having sacrificPd himself
in paying the taxes on and operating the farm. He SIJ
strongly relies on this position that we feel compellPd to
analyze it in some detail.
Te begin with, defendant's operation of the farru
was a business venture. The evidence is unrefuted that
defendant had the use of the farm upon the understanding that he would pay the taxes assessed against the
farm land. That this kind of contract was the basis of
defendant's use and occupancy of the farm is the testimony of defendant and his witnesses. Exhibit P-lt of
the J. B. \V alker case is a letter to H. A. Smith, dated
July 16, 1952 - just two years before the signature of
the deeds which here concern us. It was signed by J. B.
Walker, one of defendant's witnesses in this case, and it
contains the following language:
"All these tax receipts were given to my
brother, Austin L. "\V alker, when he was redeeming the property on taxes which he had not paid.
which were a part of the consideration for him
having the use of the property, rent free, from
1920 to date."
J. B. "\Valker also testified (JBW Record, p 156), when
asked by what agreement A. L. Walker had paid taxes
on the farm, as follows:
"that he would have the use of the property to
take care of the taxes upon it and maintain it &I
least in the condition which he received it."
Defendant made no attempt to refute that testimony. He
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('orroborakd it. At page -!35 of the Record, he said,
··tlwn· \\"(•n· yt>an; when I was not concerned for the payuwnt of those taxes, ... that mother gave me a sum of
uiorn·: tu iiay for the taxes which were delinquent preYiou:-i to that time". This can only be interpreted as an
ac·kno,,·]pdgt>ment that he had a contractual obligation,
;1,o to :-01111· yPars, to pay the taxes. It is also clear from
t!H· n·eord that defendant occupied both the pink and
orange tracts (of Exhibit 3) on the same understanding.
i[e tPstified (!{ -!37) that his right to possession was
so wdl rP<'ognized that he could have excluded his moth1•r "if thert> had been any difference" between them. At
pages .±:)-1-, -!35 and -!36 of the Record, he testified that
hP had the same kind of possession and control of the
pink property m.; of the orange.
Tht> undisputed fact is, then, that defendant had
pos~wssion and control of the entire farm for the consideration of his payment of the taxes. Exhibits D-20,
D-:23 and D--1-1 of the J. B. Walker case are an exhaustive compilation, made by J. B. Walker, of the taxes
assessed against the properties making up the farm
from rn:w to 196:2 and by whom those taxes were paid.
Those exhibits indicate a total payment by defendant
of $3,551.:25. Defendant's checks, which are in evidence,
total to something less than that. Mr. Fletcher, plaintiffs' witness as land appraiser, testified that a reasonabl1· rental for the farm from 1933 to trial date would
!tan· been $18,270.00 (JBW Record, p 2m). Since there
is no other evidence on the point, it must be concluded
that defendant rented the farm for about one-fifth of
an adequate rental. There is no evidence of the profit
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defendant actually• made from the sale of the prod UCP
from the f ann. He refused to answer an interrogaton
on the point (JB'V Record, p. 17, interrogatory• No • ~1,
p 21, answer no. 7) and no competent evidence was fp.
ceived at the trial. It is difficult to see how he establishes a strong equitable position, however, by having
taken advantage of his mother for so many years. There is testimony from many witnesses about Min.
netta's cows, how much of defendant's hay they ate, how
much feed Minnetta had to buy elsewhere and how
much in dairy products defendant received in return.
By defendant's own testimony, however, Minnetta had
disposed of all her cows by 1946 (R. 418). In 1947, again
by defendant's testimony (Deposition p. 41) he offered
to pay his mother $1,000.00 per acre for her land. Certainly at that time, when his mother was fully competent, defendant and his mother did not agree that he
had "earned" the farm. Between 1947 and 1954, defendant continued to use the farm for a token rental, gave
his mother no hay and made no other contribution
which would establish him, in equity, as his sisters' superior. During that same period, until 1952, Ila and
Roma provided Minnetta's financial support and acted
as her nurse, housekeeper and cook. When Ila becamt
ill in 1952, Minnetta went to Nevada and stayed with
plaintiff Fay Walker Lake for at least a year. Defendant
helped his mother financially only when both Ila and
Roma were too ill to be employable.
The only major change which occurred between 194;
and 1954 was the deterioration of Minnetta's mental
28

apparatn:-. lt was not until that deterioration had pro••re:-:-t>d to the point where Minnetta could not rememJwr ]wr <'hildrt-n - at least when they were out of sight
__ that defendant succeeded in the procurement of
jlinnPtta':-; signature on the instruments which disinlwritPd five of her children - including the ones who
!iad <imw the most for her.
.~

Defi>ndant has cited the several Utah cases which
Mid that the doctrine of confidential relationship has
application only when there is a showing (1) of in\'quality between the parties and (2) that the defendant

oecupi<:>d a superior position. In every one of those cases,
l)lle of the el<:>ments was obviously lacking. In Bradlmry r. Rasmussen, on which defendant heavily relies,
the evidence of inequality was entirely lacking, and the
eourt would not sustain a finding of confidential relation:-;hi p or give plaintiff the benefit of the presumption of undue influence in the absence of such evidence.
ln every other case defendant has cited for his claim
of trial court error in finding a confidential relationship, such Pvidence has been similarly lacking. Where
the two elements are shown to be present, as in Johnson
c. Johuson (supra), this court has not hesitated to give
effect to the presumption.
'rh<:> one case defendant cites where the facts are
:-;omewhat similar to those in the instant case is Anderson r. Thomas, 108 U 252, 159 P 2d 142. At page 12 of
his brief, defendant presents a statement of the facts
of that case within quotes as if it were an excerpt from
tlw court's opinion. It is not. We are certain this oo29

curred by inadvertance, and point it out only so th"
court will recognize that the abstract is defendant's
and not the court's. ln the Anderson case, the trial
court found for the dPf endant, that there was no undue
influence. In considering plaintiff's appeal, this court
reviewed the evidence of tlw grantor's mental impair.
ment and found nothing to suggest such impainnt-nt
I
let alone enough to reverse the trial court finding~. All
the evidence was to the effect that the grantor \I'll.'
perfectly able to deal with the grantee and others on
terms of reasonable equality. Interestingly, the plaintiffs appear never to have raised the question of confidential rt>lationship, and the court doesn't comment
on the doctrine or the presumption that arises from il
We believe the comment of Justice Turner, in his
concurring opinion in the Anderson case, has relevancy
to the instant case:
"I think courts should accept wills and conveyances made by the extremely aged or severely
ill with great caution. It is universally known that
serious illness and age wear down both body and
mind. Wills and conveyances, generally speaking,
should be made before the final turn, the time
when it becomes apparent that there is no hope
for recovery. In every land and in many families
there are some so saturated with greed that they.
like vultures watch the sick and dying and await
the opportu~e time to strike and ta~e e_verything
possible. Greed has no regard for Justice or decency. Courts should lend no encouragement t&
people of such character. It i~ much better thai
property be distributed according to statutory lat
than have the courts give invitation or approval
to undue influence and greed."
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Dt·frndant has eited and quoted from all the Utah
<·a,;e,; in whi('h elairns of undue influence have been as:-t>rted and rPjeetl>d. The problem is a recurrent one, and
tlwre an· as many cases where plaintiffs have failed as
tlwn• arP <·asPs where they have succeeded in proving
lUuhw influence. ~pace prohibits our analyzing each
<'a,;l' in ddail, but we ask the court to note that, in every
<':t,;<· eited hy defendant, either (1) the trial court found
for tlw lh·frndant on credible and competent evidence
and this eourt merely upheld its findings, or (2) there
"·as no eYidence of mental debility on the part of the
grantor or dominance on the part of the grantee.
The instant case is, on the contrary, a case where
the trial court found for the plaintiffs, and the evidence
oi the grantor's lack of ability to resist defendant's pressures or to exercise independent judgment, even if one
('onsiders the testimony of defendant's witnesses only,
is owrwlwlrning. The plaintiff's evidence of Minnetta's
disorientation, complete failure of memory, and inability
to recognize her children (we believe the episode of Minnetta \; failure to recognize Ila at her funeral - R 124
and 1S9 - is particularly revealing) would support findings of total incompetency.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN RECEIVING EVIDENCE AND MAKING FINDINGS AS TO UNDUE INFLUENCE EVEN THOUGH THE PRETRIAL ORDER
FAILED TO FRAME THAT ISSUE SPECIFICALLY.

Defendant's first contention, in his argument under
Point I, is that the pre-trial order failed to frame an
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issue with reference to undue influence. The order Wa.<,
of co~rse,. written by the pre-trial judge after length~'
pre-tnal, mvolved the several issues of two lawsu·tI ~.
and was considerably longer than most. Plaintiffs did
state their contention of undue influence in the general
discussion of competency during the pre-trial conferenc~.
but the plaintiffs' specific contention in this regard w~
not incorporated in the pre-trial order.
In the trial of the case, plaintiffs proceeded from the
opening statement on the theory that undue influenc~
was an issue. That issue was clearly joined in the pleadings - plaintiffs alleging the procurement of the deeds
by undue influence in the Complaint, and defendant denying it in his Answer. During the trial, reference Wa.5
made to the fact that certain testimony was being adduced because of its relevancy on the issue of undue influence, and no attempt was then made to exclude it. The
trial judge himself stated repeatedly that undue influence was an issue (R 296, 338, 409, 416) without objection from defendant, and defendant adduced evidence
m rebuttal on the issue (R-409).
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the Court shall make an order limiting the
issues "to those not disposed of by admissions or a.gm
ments of counsel". There were no admissions or agreements at the pre-trial conference which could have elim·
inated undue influence as an issue, and it was sheer in·
advertance that specific language on the point was not
incorporated in the order.
We believe the defendant should have made some
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of his contPntion that undue influence was not an
issu1• at the tinw of trial instead of permitting plaintiffs
ti> proeP(~d on that theory. The policy of Rule 15(b)
:-;lwuld in any event be held to control. "When issues not
rai~e<l . . . are tried by express or implied consent of
thP parties, they shall be treated as if they had been
nused ... "
110111 t

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS RULINGS ON THE
"DEAD MAN'S STATUTE."

l t appears to be defendant's position that if, in a
proceeding of this kind, any evidence of undue influence
is pnmitted to be introduced by the estate's administrator, the adverse party must be permitted to testify as to
all conversations, matters and transactions which must
have been equally within his knowledge and that of the
dPeeased. It is therefore his position that the plaintiff,
in an action of this kind, may not undertake to prove his
allegations by evidence of any kind without waiving the
protedion of the statute. It can hardly have been the
inh•ntion of the legislature that a party against whom an
administrator proceeds should become competent to testify about the proscribed matters as soon as the admini:;trator introduces any evidence at the trial. It is almost
startling that, in his Point I, defendant maintains plaintiffs adduced no evidence of undue influence, and, in
Point II, he maintains plaintiff waived statutary protection by adducing such evidence.
Defendant points to no instance, in the course of
thP trial, \vhere plaintiffs were allowed to testify about
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tram;action::-; et1ually within the knowledge of defendant
and deceased, hut defendant was not. As a matter of fll('l
the court was most scrupulou::-; in finding waivers. For
example, defendant did not record the deeds in 4uestion
from the time of their signature until hi::-; mother' 8 death.
more than five year::-; later. \\re believe his reasons wer~
obvious; he had procured the signature::-; in secret and
if plaintiffs became aware of the instruments, thev
would certainly have litigated ~linnetta's competenc;·
when her mental condition could have been scientifieaU;·
investigated. Since delivery was a transaction which
must have been equally within the knowledge of the
defendant and the deceased, plaintiffs objected to defendant's testifying about delivery. The court ruled,
however, that defendant could so testify because plain.
tiffs, in taking defendant's deposition, had asked him
how much money he had paid his mother "at the time
of the conveyances". By using the word ''conveyances''
instead of "signing", plaintiffs waived the protection of
the statute, said the court, as to defendant's testifying
about delivery and about :Minnetta's conversation at the
time ( R. 405-6). This is conversation which the bank officer, by the way, doesn't remember (R. 318).
Furthermore, the record contains a full exposition of
the defendant's conduct over the years, and this is the
conduct which he maintains is the foundation of his great
merit as compared with his brothers and sisters. He was
even able to adduce the testimony of his brother J. B.
Walker (who was certainly committed to an agreement
with defendant that he would help defendant to keep the
pink property if defendant would help J. B. to keep the
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1 ,rnn~1· - - :-;PP diseussion at R. 361 ff.) that ~linnetta had
:-;aid s]J(' \ms g-iving dPfrndant the property in considi•rat1()n of his S(•rvices. Only Robert :F'rost could have
pnt rnorP poit,rnant words into Minnetta's mouth than
,lid .1. H. Walker.
Tlw trial jndge was apparently persuaded that Minnetta had so11ie conception of what she was doing when
:-;]w sig1wd tlw dPeds. He did not find her incom~tent.
Bnt the trial judge was convinced that whatever motive
or ich·a sh1· might have expressed was implanted by de1\·ndant. What she said was not even material if she
,\·as unduly induced to accept the idea she was expressing. lf defendant persuaded his mother he was entitled
to tht> land becam;e he had paid taxes on it and farmed
it, he implanted a false belief. He had, on the evidence
in this c·ast>, really takPn advantage of her by paying less
than a fifth of adequate rental.
lt is intPresting that defendant also paid the taxes
against and farmed the land J.B. Walker claimed in the
l'ompanion case. J. B. \V alker has felt no moral compubion to convey that land to defendant.

The rPcord herein is so full of the kind of testimony
Ul'ft>ndant claims he was prevented from giving that the
l'nurt's rulings are hardly reversible error. To the extent that defendant made a record of the excluded testimony, as provided by Rule 43 (c), Utah Rules of Civil
Prnepdure, it would appear that the testimony would have
l1ppn cumulative and immaterial as to whether Minnetta
was unduly influenced. The question is not whether
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she was motivakd but wheth(•r she was undub'.J Ill
· dUCl'iJ.
to lX' so motivated.
We believe the cases, including those cited by di-.
fendant, support the trial court's rulings. There is nr
waiver of statutory protection when an administrat<n
introduces evidence except as to the specific transactii,1,
to which that evidence relates. In particular, we wouia
refer this Court to Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Opensli,111 ,
Inv. Co., 102 G 509, 132 P. 2d 388; Cook v. Jones, 115 r.
536, 206 P 2d 630; and In re Pitcher's Estate, 114 [i~.
197 p 2d 143.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A
CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEFENDA~T
AND HIS SISTER ILA.

The finding of a confidential relationship between
defendant and his sister was entirely unnecessary to
support the judgment and final order as it related h
Ila's property. The court did not, of course, make a finriing of undue influence or avoid the transfers from Ila
to defendant. If it is defendant's position (despite the
testimony of his witness, Mrs. Strickland, R. 330) thai
Ila did not repose trust and confidence in him, we wouM
see no harm in expunging that finding from the record
The order that defendant account, however, resul~
from his admission that he received the property m
trust. He is asked to make the kind of accounting trustet'i
must always make and distribute any remaining pro~
erty to the beneficiaries of the trust.
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lf tlH' finding <ll'fendant questions is error, it is
harnd1·:':' t>rror. Plaintiffs felt it was material, in a case
11 ·hi1·h put:' at i:-;sm• the question of defendant's capacity
f 11 r 1n1po~ing his will on the mentally affected, that Ila
11 ·11uld :'1·l1•d a:-; trustee, in 1954, a person about whom,
111 1!J;):!, :'hl' :'aid this: ( Exh P-8, page 5)
"l have never seen so much crust as the A. L.
family has. \Vhen mother left, Gladys took everything- tlwre was around the place that could be
Paten."

an<l on pag-P 3:
"that doet'n't mean I don't have to pay back everyone but Aust and as I told Mary that was a means
of my eollecting what they owe me."
POINT V
THE TRIAL COVRT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING DEFENDANT COMPENSATION FOR HIS SERVICES AS
TRl1STEE.

])pfendant takes an incredible posture with reference
to hi8 trusteeship. He admits the trust but denies respon~ibility to account. Plaintiffs asked for an aceounting
and 'n're nwt with the flat statement that the trust
a8~ets had bePn exhausted. This is even defendant's position in the pleadings filed in this lawsuit.
The evidence is that defendant still holds the real

pro1wrty and securities he received from Ila. Out of one
side of his mouth, he tells the Internal Revenue Service
that his expenditures for Minnetta after 1954 were out
of his own resources. Out of the other side of his mouth,
he tt>lls the court and plaintiffs that those expenditures
WPre out of trust assets.
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He admits comingling of the trust assets with hi8
own (R 427) and he claims to haYt> acquir0d those assets
by paying money for his motht r between 1954 and 1959.
Presumably, he df'cides whether he is buying the trust
assets by these devices after he discovers whether the
trust assets (realty and securities) are appreciating or
depreciating.
1

Defendant's total course of conduct - his refusal
to account, his self dealing, his comingling of assets_
has violated his obligation as fiduciary. He cannot now
demand compensation. Extended citation of authority
on this point should not be necessary. 'Ne quote th~
following, however, from Scott's Abridgment of the
Law of Trusts (Austin Wakeman Scott, 1960, Little.
Brown And Co.), Section - 243, page 521:
"Where a trustee has committed a breach of
trust, the court may in its discretion either allow
him full compensation or deny him all compensa.
tion or allow him reduced compensation .... "
"The court has denied compensation whe~
the trustee has repudiated the trust, or where h~
has misappropriated trust property, or where he
has failed to keep accounts . . . "
The trial court simply denied compensation in this ag·
gravatl:'d situation.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT A LIEN FOR TAXES AND IMPROVEMENTS ON
HIS MOTHER'S PROPERTY.

The evidence is that defendant contracted to oe.cupY
and occupied the pink and orange property of Exhibiti
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i'or paying the taxes. There is no contrary evidence. Defl'Hdant dt·ci<lt>d what erops to plant and what produce
il' :o:\·11. HP rPfusPd to answer an interrogatory about his
:-:ak~ and inl'orne from farming - at least he never did
an~\n•r it. 11 l' testified he had complete control of the
,ink and orangP property. Any testimony that he got
1
h,: than value for anything he gave the family is m<'i>nc·lu~iv<' and refuted.

Def Pndant received the use of property having area·'onah!P n·ntal valu<' of $18,270.00 (JBW Record 297).
He pai<l taxes totalling $3,551.25 (JBW Exh. D-20, D2:l, D--1-1, D-12, R. 407, 435). This was cheap rent for
the u~(' of -10 acres of land for 42 years. He has certainly
,-Jinwn no entitlPment to reimbursement of amounts exIH'ndt>d undt•r thPse circumstances.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Huie 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
c·nwring new trials, provides a wide latitude for the trial
eourt in actions which are tried without a jury. The rule
provides:
''On a motion for a new trial in an action tried
without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment."
Sinee this case involves an action tried without a
.i 1ry, it is important to note the distinction between jury
and nonjury trials as relates to motions for new trials.
1
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Each
case cited bv• Appellant in his brief involved a JUr1
·
.
trial, and they do not assist the court in this case e ·
X~fl'
for some of the general criteria for granting new triab
which would be equally applicable to both types of e&~,
When an action is tried without a jury, the <'~)Un
necessarily has greater freffiom in determining what lb
action should be on a motion for new trial. 6 Moorf\
Federal Practice, p. 3772, Para. 59.07.
It has been uniformly held by this Court that a n~w
trial based upon newly discovered evidence will not\){'
granted unless the new evidence is of a character as i~
likely to change the result of the case. Universal Invest.
ment Co. v. Carpets, Incorpora.ted, ______ Utah ---... ,400 P.2d
564; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264:
Tanner v. Stevens, 8 Utah 75, 30 P. 24. In a jury trial
the court, in considering a motion for new trial, can at
best only conjecture as to whether or not the new evidence
would have changed the jury's verdict. This is not the
case when the court which heard the evidence and made
the finding is also considering the new evidence. In this
situation, the court is able to weigh the new evideneii
against that presented at the trial, and will know abso·
lutely if this new evidence would have resulted in a
different finding.
The quoted provisions of Rule 59 (a) apply a distinctive procedure in the case of non-jury trials. The rule
permits the court to determine if the new evidence is of
such importance as to be decisive upon its :findings. If it
finds this to be the case, it can then have the case reopened
and the additional evidence adduced. This procedure rec40

ognizes the t•xpense involved in the trial de novo of a case.
Although an entire new trial is necessary in a jury case, it
~erves no useful purpose in most non-jury cases.
ThiR C'Ourt has consistently followed the rule that the
,jp 11 ial or granting of a motion for new trial rests in the
<li:-;erPtion of the trial judge and is reviewable only when
then· is a plain showing of an abuse of that discretion.
{" 11 irl'rsal /nustment Co. v. Carpets, Incorporated,
,.,upra; Cptou·n Appliance & Radio Co., Inc. v. Flint, 122
nah 298, ~-19 P.2d 826; Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122,
~.J:7 P .:!d :.W.t.
It is submitted that the review of a trial court's de-

nial of a motion for a new trial based upon newly disl'owred evidence should be even more constricted than
this, where the case is tried before the court without a
jury. Respondents know of no case where this court has
('onsidered the distinction between motions for new trials
in jury and non-jury trials. There appears to be a paueity of decisions on this point in other jurisdictions as
well. 66 C.J .S. p. 71, New Trials §3, makes reference to
new trials applying particularly to jury trials. The statement then goes on to say that some jurisdictions permit
new trials after a decision by a court.
In the case of Arias v. Springer, 42 N. Mex. 350, 78
P.2d 153, the court states that it is unnecessary to grant
a new trial in an equity case, since reopening the case to
take additional testimony is adequate, and that new trials
apply to law cases only. The court did not specifically
discuss the distinction between jury and non-jury trials.
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The point appearing to lw one of fin;t illl}lf"'".
for this Court, Respondents urge the wisdom of a dif.
ferent rule for non-jury cases from that in jury C'.asei
as regards motions for new trials on the basis of new!r
discovered evidence. \Vhere the motion is address~
to the Court which was the trier of the facts, the app~J.
late court should take due note that the ruling of the
trial court determines whether or not the new evidentf
would have been decisive in the original case. This Coun
should reverse a denial of such a motion only when tlif·
new evidence, coupled with that properly admitted in t]1,
trial of the cause, requires a different result in the casi:
as a matter of law.

,~.,ion

Turning from the question of the extent to whicb
this court should review the denial of the motion for ne\\"
trial to the new evidence Appellant sought to introducii,
it is seen that this evidence would not be decisive in am
regard. As a matter of fact it would have been contra.
dictory of Appellant's own testimony. The affidavit~
relate to a period around 1948-49 when the witnes8P.'
allegedly were told that Minnetta was going to kee;'
the property for Appellant so he could place a supermarket on the property.
In his deposition, Appellant testified to a seri~~
of discussions where real estate agents and other people.
in 1947 and thereafter, had sought to buy a part of the
property and that shortly after this time he reached an
agreement with his mother whereby he would purcha.11
the property for $1,000.00 per acre (Austin Walker
Deposition pp. 34 to 41.) This agreement, aceording to
Appellant's statements, was not changed by any further
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di:·wussion betwt>l'n appellant and his mother at least
until rn:>-1. ClParly the evidence by which Appellant
~"nght a nPW trial would have been superceded by this
la1t·r agTi>Pmt•nt which appellant never consummated
Ji~· tlw payuH'nt of the purchase price.
The af fi<lavits further fail to show due diligence on
.\Jlrwllant'~ part in attempting to adduce the evidence
at the trial. As to the Ray 8mith evidence, Appellant
athnits talking to l\lr. 8mith prior to the trial about
.\Ir. Smith's negotiations with l\1innetta. Appellant's
affidavit only says that he failed to ask Mr. Smith the
din•et questions involved in the suit. It is difficult to
1wn·eivP what conversations Appellant could have had
with Mr. Smith relative to the case which would not
mvolve the matter in the affidavit. In any event, it is
:mlnnitted a showing of due diligence cannot be predieatl'd upon the failure of the moving party to ask a
prospective witness the only material questions which
tht· ,,·itn1:ss could be expected to answer.
The Appellant's affidavit does not give any insight
as to how he learned of the proffered testimony of Glen
C. ~ehmidt. He merely states he learned of this in January, 19G3. \\~ e can only conjecture whether or not he had
any information about Mr. Schmidt before trial which
through due diligence could have developed his testimony at the trial. To obtain a new trial, the Appellant
must show that he could not have developed the testimony at the trial through the exercise of due diligence.
Without a showing by Appellant of the steps he took to
lParn of the testimony, we cannot determine if due dilif.\"Pner could have produced the witness at the trial.
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As to Hex Colt•, no lllPntion wa8 madl' bv• A1lpt>ll
. 8.llt
during tlw trial that he had Let•n unable to contact th~
witrn•ss, nor did he rt>qm·st a continuanct>, to obtain th,.
presence of this witness. In Lindsay 1,·. Eccles llotel CrJ.,
3 U. 2d. 364, 284 P.2d 477, 478, this failure to app~
thl• court of the t>xistencR of a material witness and It
r1•quest a continuance was lwld to demonstrate a laek
of due diligence. J<-,urther, the affidavit of Appt-llBlJ·
indicates that tlw only thing he did after the trial whieb
was not done bt>fore trial was to telephone Mr. Colti.
As to each of these witnesses, Appellant has faile<h
establish due diligence in attempting to produce th~
testimony at the trial. The evidence sought to be ad.
duced from the witnesses would not require a different
result in the case, is remote in point of time from tbt'
1954 conveyances, and is contrary to Appellant's testimony of a subsequent agreement to purchase the property from his mother for a fixed cash purchase pril'I'.
For these reasons, Respondents submit the trial court
did not err in denying Appellant's motion for new trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial court chose to grant relief to plaintifb
in this case on their proof of undue influence with tM
assistance of the preswnption which arises upon estahlishment of the fact of "confidential relationship." Sintt
the undue influence finding was a sufficient basis for
affording plaintiffs all the relief they sought, the court
considered it unnecessary to find either (1) that MiJ.
netta was incompetent or (2) that defendant had~
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or aC'knowh·dgPd, after l\linnetta's death, that he
iwld lwr pro1wrty in trust for himself and plaintiffs.

,.,: 11·,·d

\\"1· lwli1·w tlw evidt-nce actually compels both ad11111111.al fi111lings. Tlw plaintiffs' evidence of Minnetta's
Jllal iii it y to reeogn ize her children, her disorientation
a:-: to ti1111· and plaee, her complete failure of memory,
a 111 i tlw dt>wlopment in her of all the classic physical
.. 1, 11 (·01111tants of mental deterioration is thoroughly con,·irll'lll~. To n•fufr it, defendant presented this testi111nny :
l.
D1·frndant's daughter said Minnetta didn't know
what day it was but could say something about
thP wt>ather .
.,

l)pft•ndant 's wife said Minnetta was failing all
tlw time but wasn't really "gone."

:L

~I innetta's

physician said Minnetta was clearly
:-:enile but he thought she was competent on the
majority of his visits.

With refPrence to the acknowledgement by defendant that he took the property only to avoid probate
and lwld it for tlw heirs, we have the testimony of three
pt>ople who wPre present when he made that st.atementDon Lakt:>, R. E. Walker and Carol Lake (R. 130, 194,
~ti3 ). In rt•futation, we have only defendant's denial.
Dt:>fondant apparently contends his testimony is
111on• crt:>dible than plaintiffs' because he is a school
t..achPr and WB.8 a bishop. Without commenting on the1e
al'< tt•sts of credibility, we would remind the court that
di.ft->ndant has admitted misrepresenting the source of
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l'u11d:-- i1:--1·d 1'11r \lilllwtta in 1•r•·;1ari11!..; Iii:- ta\ r\'\11r 11 an.J
lia:-- ad11iitt1·1I 1·1111ii11!..;l;11~· t n1:--t ;1:-:--<'l:-- \\1th Iii,- 11wn.

\\·,. \\111ild al,.;11 p111111 11111 111 t!J,. 1·1Hirt that dt>fi·nq.
<lilt':- \1it11"""· .I. I\. \\alk1·r. tl',.;t1t'i1·d that Iii· :--p1·nt 111 ,tb
Thank:--!..;i\ in~· and ( 'liri:--t11i;1:-- 111' I ~1.-1-t \\ itli Iii" 111. 1tLn,
1 l:. :;-;--;-,:;-;--.;!,and tlii,- t1·:--ti1111111> \Ul:' d1·11i1·d h> plaintif:
Homa \\'alker Oroek. Plai11t iffs 1hl'll introdueed .J. B.
\\'alk1·r':-- diar> for 1~1;1-t \\hidi n·nal:-: that .I. B. \\'alhr
\\·a:- at l1·a,.;t lllistak1·n in liis t1·sti11i1111> ( l·:\hil1it 1'-] 11 ,
( >11 th1· \\ 11011· n·1·ord thn1· is littl1• rl'ason tog-in• <ll'ft·nd.
allt's \\ it1wss1•s 111on· ('J'l•d1·1w" tliall plaintiffs', partii·u.
larl:-· \1·h1·n plaint i !Ts 1·Yid1·1w1· is ah1 ays <·orrohorat1·d hy
11ospital n·1·ords and oth1·r \\'rittn1 llll'llloranda.

1

\\'1• s11li111it that plai11tit't's should lrn\'P liPPTl ~ranted
n•liPf 1111 \'\'<'!'>- thPory 1·xpn·ssPd i11 thl'ir <'omplaint. l:
\\'OU\d J11• a !'Hilk injust i1·1• if this ('0111'1 \\ \'l'l' to hold that
tlt1· trial judg-1' ('ould not n·asonalily han• found. on th•
1•YidPrn·1·, a 1·m1t'id1·11tial n·lationship in whi<·h d!'f.. ndac•
had tltl' dorninant position arnl of \1·hi<·h h1• took adrantag-P by pro<·uring- tlu• sig-mltun· of dP<•ds <·onnyin~ ail
his moth<•r's proJH•rty to him and d1•JH'iYing- ht>r oth~r
h1•i rs of tlH·ir ju~t inheritam·e.
HPspPetfully submitted,

FRASK J. ALLEX
THO.'.\L\S C. (TTllBERT
3f>l South State Street

Salt Lake City, l·tah
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